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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001737

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

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SUBJECT: DARFUR CEASEFIRE PLANS HAVE UNAMID FEELING THE HEAT

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1734

1B. KHARTOUM 1697

1C. KHARTOUM 1698

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
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11. (C) SUMMARY: On December 2, Acting UNAMID Political Chief and head of the DDDC Abdul Mohammed and Sudan Scholar Alex DeWaall told CDA Fernandez that UNAMID has been frantically trying to throw together a proposal for a ceasefire commission in the last week. Mohammed promised to deliver UNAMID's proposal to the Embassy "within a few days" and, spurred by an alternate US proposal (reftels), asked that UNAMID be allowed to present its plan and identify areas where U.S. assistance is required. DeWaall emphasized that although Darfur urgently needs a ceasefire commission right now, any mechanism will require updated mapping of rebel positions, non-military logistical support for armed groups, technical training on the ceasefire, and embedded monitors of the ceasefire. The intent of the presentation appeared to be to protect UNAMID's turf from the US proposal on monitoring the Darfur ceasefire, and additional pressure from the US side in pushing its own "bridging" plan may well force a recalcitrant UNAMID into action. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) Following the December 1 DDDC briefing (reftel A,) Abdul Mohammed and sidekick cum political prop Alex DeWaall switched gears on December 2 visiting the Embassy to discuss a ceasefire monitoring mechanism for Darfur. Mohammed said that since President Bashir's announced ceasefire at the Sudan People's Initiative and the more recent U.S. offer of help to establish a monitoring mechanism for violence (reftel B-C) UNAMID has been scrambling to draft a proposal for the ceasefire commission. Mohammed said that UN DPKO has sent strong orders to UNAMID to immediately come up with a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, despite the fact that "UN headquarters has very little trust in UNAMID." According to Mohammed, DPKO has already sent some feedback to UNAMID's initial outlines saying that they want a "lighter" proposal, (to which Mohammed responded, "we aren't exactly sure what that means") and CDA Fernandez quipped that if UNAMID were any lighter it would be invisible.

13. (C) Mohammed and DeWaall both emphasized that the GOS has appeared very receptive to UNAMID's establishment of such a mechanism and that senior officials from NISS Chief Salah Gosh to the Sudanese AT;vkgQQeX;Qarfur's rebels are already very skeptical about any such proposal, and that unless the proposal is robust, they will inevitably reject UNAMID's proposal.

14. (C) Having been involved in security arrangements discussions in Darfur for the last four years, DeWaall said that although a mechanism is needed in the short term, UNAMID

needs to establish a sustainable mechanism. "After the failed mechanisms of the past, we know what we have to do to make this work," said DeWaal, naming four specific ingredients of a functional ceasefire mechanism. First, the ceasefire commission will need to have reliable and comprehensive maps of rebel positions and controlled areas. "All agreements have fallen apart when it comes to mapping," said DeWaal, saying that JEM, SLA/Unity, and SLM/MM's fluid positions complicate this exercise (SLM-AW positions in Jebel Marra are more static). Second, armed groups will need to receive non-military logistical support, as "a fighter cannot respect a ceasefire if he doesn't respect himself." Third, DeWaal said that all armed elements (including the GoS) will need to receive technical training on the meaning of the ceasefire, as this is a very technical, specific, and complex agreement which needs to be fully understood by the field commanders. Fourth, DeWaal said that any ceasefire commission will need an embedded monitoring and reporting element. This will most likely begin at Darfur's airports where ceasefire monitors will log GOS aircraft and flight plans. Monitors will eventually be embedded both in GOS and rebel units.

¶5. (C) Both DeWaal and Mohammed acknowledged that UNAMID is already mandated with carrying out some of these functions, but that the mission has been too conservative and afraid of

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angering the GoS. Mohammed said that UNAMID's cautious approach must change, while DeWaal said that UNAMID has been worse than AMIS about reporting GoS violations. DeWaal said that the "Chadian factor" and JEM will complicate the creation of a ceasefire mechanism. "The GOS will not be 'boxed in' when it comes to Chad, and this obviously applies to JEM as well," stated DeWaal. DeWaal said that even if this ceasefire commission is not effective when it comes to Chad and JEM that, "you can still make a difference in two-thirds of the territory and improve security and the lives of Darfuris there." Mohammed admitted that UNAMID fully realizes that "over 70 percent" of the violent actions in Darfur are government initiated and that this plus SAF air operations gives wide scope for the regime to begin to tone down the tempo of operations if it really wants such an effort to succeed.

¶6. (C) CDA Fernandez discussed GOS officials' mixed reactions to the U.S. offer to assist Sudan establish a ceasefire commission. DeWaal noted that the U.S. offer had pushed UN DPKO and UNAMID to start working on a ceasefire commission. CDA Fernandez said that regardless as to what plan UNAMID composes, there is value to including space for U.S. involvement and that some GoS actors such as NISS Chief Salah Gosh seem to have recognized the value of U.S. involvement. Mohammed then ended the meeting stating that UNAMID would complete its plan, identify areas for U.S. assistance, and then deliver a copy of this plan to the Embassy for feedback.

COMMENT

¶7. (C) Abdul Mohammed noticeably failed to mention Chief Mediator Bassole during the entire meeting. The DDDC Chief is obviously trying to try to inject himself into the center of every solution for Darfur. DeWaal likely knows that he is being played by Mohammed, but his expertise is still valuable for UNAMID and for informing the frantic and often incoherent Mohammed. During A/S Hook's upcoming December 3-4 trip to El-Fasher we will discuss this further with other UNAMID officials and urge other senior UNAMID officials to become involved and not simply let Mohammed run the show. The U.S. should continue to push our offer of assistance for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for violence in Darfur, at least as a way of pressing both the Khartoum regime and DPKO. This offer has certainly lit a fire under UNAMID.

FERNANDEZ